People with lived experience are individuals who have first-hand experience of the medical condition being considered. The value of including the viewpoints of people with lived experience in health policy, health care, and health care and systems research has been recognized at many levels, including by funding agencies. However, there is little guidance or established best practices on how to include non-academic reviewers in the grant review process. Here we describe our approach to the inclusion of people with lived experience (...) in every stage of the grant review process. After a budget was created for a specific call, a steering committee was created. This group included researchers, people with lived experience, and health systems administrators. This group developed and issued the call. After receiving proposals, stage one was scientific review by researchers. Grants were ranked by this score and a short list then reviewed by people with lived experience as stage two. Finally, for stage three, the Steering Committee convened and achieved consensus based on information drawn from stages one and two. Our approach to engage people with lived experience in the grant review process was positively reviewed by everyone involved, as it allowed for patient perspectives to be truly integrated. However, it does lengthen the review process. The proposed model offers further practical insight into including people with lived experience in the review process. (shrink)

People with lived experience are individuals who have first-hand experience of the medical condition being considered. The value of including the viewpoints of people with lived experience in health policy, health care, and health care and systems research has been recognized at many levels, including by funding agencies. However, there is little guidance or established best practices on how to include non-academic reviewers in the grant review process. Here we describe our approach to the inclusion of people with lived experience (...) in every stage of the grant review process. After a budget was created for a specific call, a steering committee was created. This group included researchers, people with lived experience, and health systems administrators. This group developed and issued the call. After receiving proposals, stage one was scientific review by researchers. Grants were ranked by this score and a short list then reviewed by people with lived experience as stage two. Finally, for stage three, the Steering Committee convened and achieved consensus based on information drawn from stages one and two. Our approach to engage people with lived experience in the grant review process was positively reviewed by everyone involved, as it allowed for patient perspectives to be truly integrated. However, it does lengthen the review process. The proposed model offers further practical insight into including people with lived experience in the review process. (shrink)

Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's Critique of Berkeley HENRY E. ALLISON THE CLAIMTHAT KANT'S IDEALISM,or at least certain strands of it, is essentially identical to that of Berkeley has a long and distinguished history. It was first voiced by several of Kant's contemporaries such as Mendelssohn, Herder, Hamann, Pistorius and Eberhard who attacked the alleged subjectivism of the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This viewpoint found its sharpest contemporary expression in the (...) notorious Garve-Feder review to which Kant responded at length in the Prolegomena. In subsequent times it has been championed by Schopenhauer, and most nineteenth century German commentators on the relation between the two philosophers. 2 In addition, it has been, and continues to be, the prevailing view of the vast majority of British writers on Kant, including, with significant qualifications, Norman Kemp Smith. 3 This tradition continues despite the fact that Kant specifically, and in no uncertain terms, repudiated this identification in the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. In both works he responds to the charges of subjectivism, and in so doing distinguishes his position from that of Berkeley, who in the eighteenth century was commonly regarded as a solipsist and denier of the "external world." 4 In contra-distinction to Kant's own critical or transcendental idealism, which explains the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the realm of possible experience, Berkeley is characterized as a "dogmatic" or "visionary idealist." He is judged guilty of "degrading bodies to mere illusion" (B69), of regarding things in space as "merely imaginary entities" (B274), and of holding with all "genuine idealists" that: "all knowledge through the senses and experience is i Cf. Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892), II, 494-505. Cf. Friederich Fredericks, Der Phainomenale Idealisraus Berkeley's und Kant's (Berlin, 1871); Robert Zimmerman, "Ober Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus yon Berkeley" (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Philox.-hist. Kl.), LXVIII (1871); Gustav Dieckert, tiber dos Verhiiltnis des Berkeleyschen ldealismus zu Kantischen Vernun]tkritik (Konitz, 1888). Tiffs is a consequence of the general British tendency to view Kant in phenomenalist terms. A typical recent example is found in P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kant's Critique o[ Pure Reason (2nd ed., rev., 1923) takes greaZ pains to distinguish between the subjectivist strand in Kant's thought, which is essentially identical to Berkeley's position, and the genuine critical doctrine which stands side by side with it in the text. 9 Cf. I-I.M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Materialism 1710-1733, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding is there truth" (374). 5 One of the chief reasons for the continuation of the Kant-Berkeley tradition is that these, and similar statements about Berkeley, which we find in these works and in Kant's correspondenc e with Beck, have not been taken very seriously by Kant's critics. They are usually dismissed as obvious misinterpretations, due to Kant's ignorance of Berkeley's actual writings, and of his reliance upon distorted second and third hand accounts of Berkeley's thought such as is to be found in Beattie. Furthermore, this view is often supported by the philological reflection that Kant did not read English, and that Berkeley's writings were not yet available in German translation. 6 The philological argument, however, loses much of its force when we consider that there was indeed a German translation of Berkeley's Dialogues, which although apparently unknown to nineteenth century scholars, was readily accessible to Kant. This is to be found, together with a translation of Collier's Clavis Universalis and critical analyses, in a work by the professor of philosophy at Rostock, Johann Christian Eschenbach, entitled: Samlung der vornehmsten Schri[tsteller die die tFirklichkeit ihres eignen K~rpers und der ganzen Ki~rperwelt leugnen (Rostock, 1756). Furthermore, in addition to this work, which was probably known to Kant, there is Berkeley's important Latin work, De Motu (1721), as well as French translations of many of... (shrink)

Gordon Baker and I had been colleagues at St John’s for almost ten years when we resolved, in 1976, to undertake the task of writing a commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. We had been talking about Wittgenstein since 1969, and when we cooperated in writing a long critical notice on the Philosophical Grammar in 1975, we found that working together was mutually instructive, intellectually stimulating and great fun. We thought that we still had much to say about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and (...) it seemed to us that misinterpretations of passages in the Investigations were so extensive that it would be worth trying to write a detailed analytical commentary. It is difficult to recapture the excitement of those early days in being among the first to work on the microfilms and, subsequently, on the photocopies of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. We spent many hundreds of hours poring over the typescripts and the often only semi-legible manuscripts, fascinated and privileged to be able to try to follow the development of the thoughts of a great philosophical genius. We talked endlessly about what we had found in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts, and debated how it should be understood. The first fruit of our labours was Wittgenstein – Understanding and Meaning. Its guiding idea was to draw attention to the manner in which Wittgenstein linked the concepts of meaning, understanding and explanation, and so to bypass the connections between meaning, truth and truth-conditions that so fascinated philosophers of the 1970s, and to abandon the red-herring of assertion-conditions and anti-realism. After a hiatus of four years, during which time we wrote a controversial book entitled Frege – Logical Excavations and a polemical book on contemporary philosophy of language – Language, Sense. (shrink)

... 243-) INTRODUCTION §§243- constitute the eighth 'chapter' of the book. Its point of departure is a natural query with respect to the conclusion of the ...

Sympathy, empathy, and compassion are strands in the network of love and essential corollaries of friendship. Together with love and friendship, they are the saving graces of mankind. This chapter aims to clarify the relationship between sympathy and empathy. It may be helpful first to list the relevant dispositions, tendencies, powers, and feelings. The most important contributions to the analysis of sympathy were Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature and Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It was they who (...) provided the first extensive phenomenological description and philosophical anatomy of sympathy. It is noteworthy that Theodor Lipps had translated Hume's Treatise into German. His account of empathy had its roots in Hume's projectivism. With the demise of behaviourism in the 1970s, the notion of empathy became an object for reflections of experimental and practical psychologists and therapists. (shrink)

The distinction between shame cultures and guilt cultures is due to the anthropologist Ruth Benedict. The moral education of the youth in a shame culture will involve a multitude of prescriptions determining how to conduct oneself. Heroic societies with a closed aristocratic warrior class are typically shame cultures. The form of the dominant norms of a guilt culture is the imperative or dominative tense, which determines what one is obligated to do. This is the typical form of the obligation‐imposing commandments (...) of God. A primary focus of shame in the emerging guilt culture became sexuality and the body, and shame became forcefully riveted to the notion of sin. Feeling shame, like feeling pride, lies at the centre of a ramifying cluster of emotions and emotional attitudes. Shame bears a kinship to embarrassment. Embarrassment is distinguished from feeling shame in so far as it is essentially an audience‐involving emotion. (shrink)

Throughout its long history metaphysics has been variously conceived. At its most sublime, it has been taken to be the study of the super‐sensible, in particular of the existence of a god, the nature of the soul, and the possibility of an afterlife. When the young Ludwig Wittgenstein entered the lists, it was entirely reasonable to conceive of metaphysics in this manner. Its subject matter was held to be the language‐independent and thought‐independent de re necessities of the world. The Tractatus (...) is dominated by three problems: first, the nature of logic and logical necessity; secondly, the essence of the proposition and hence the characterization of the general propositional form; and thirdly, the intentionality of the proposition. Logical propositions are combinations of elementary propositions by means of truth‐functional logical connectives. The metaphysics adumbrated in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein thought, was required for the possibility of representation and for the possibility of logic. (shrink)

Given the ubiquity of the phenomena of anger and the roots of the emotion in the animal nature, it is not surprising that human languages have a rich vocabulary to express, report, describe, and evaluate the various manifestations and expressions of anger. Different cultures and different languages have evolved their distinctive orgetic vocabularies. This chapter is concerned with the family of concepts of anger, as expressed in English. The doctrine of the humours is reflected in the iconography of anger. Eichler's (...) engraved illustration for Ripa's iconological analysis of Cholericus depicts an angry youth – for the young, Ripa explained, like the choleric, lack judgement. The chapter discusses the physiognomy, behavioural manifestations, and verbal expressions of anger. So much for the connective analysis of anger. People's understanding of the place of anger in human life can be deepened and enriched by scrutiny of some of the ancient literary and philosophical descriptions and analyses of the phenomena. (shrink)

Actions done out of jealousy or envy are vicious. The corresponding character traits – having a jealous or envious disposition – are vices. Envy motivates ever greater efforts in the pursuit of private wealth, and, coupled with greed and covetousness, stimulates acquisitive competition, thus benefiting the economy. Envy is often linked to Schadenfreude. Jealousy characteristically involves hostility if not hatred towards the person who is taking away the love one feels is due to one, and engenders bitterness, hostility, or hatred (...) towards the person one loved. Like many emotions, envy and jealousy provide motives for action. For in both cases there are characteristic patterns of backward‐ and forward‐looking reasons for action. There are numerous biblical tales to illustrate the evils of envy, and others that demonstrate the vice of jealousy. For the most part, qin'ah is condemned as a serious and self‐destructive vice. (shrink)

In antiquity the subject of friendship occupied centre stage in discussions of the good life. Friendship is possible between people who are not equals in virtue, status, power, or intellect, but then, Aristotle argues, it is a less than perfect form of friendship. Friendship is a focal concept, the focus of which is the friendship of men of excellence and virtue who are, in relevant respects, equals. Aristotle's detailed investigations of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics set the stage and determined (...) the questions to be addressed in all subsequent discussions. The abstract noun philia brackets both love and friendship. Aristotle argued that the origins of philia lie in the household. This chapter discusses prominent characteristics of friendship. It is believed that friendship is a relationship, not an emotion. That relationship may be deep or superficial (casual), depending upon the strength and depth of the feelings that obtain. (shrink)

Jealousy often wreaks havoc among those who love each other. There are many different forms of jealousy. These can be brought to light by scrutiny of grammar, which discloses the scope and limits of the concept of jealousy and hence too of the emotion it subsumes. In Bronzino's painting, Jealousy has a livid complexion (a mixture of yellow and black bile). Robert Herrick's poem in Anthony Frederick Sandys's painting, however, associates jealousy with yellow. In this, he too was following the (...) doctrine of the humours, which explained jealousy by reference to an excess of the choleric humour of yellow bile that causes anger, irritability, boldness, envy, jealousy, and courage. The chapter elaborates the manifold differences between two emotions, envy and jealousy, and the corresponding character traits and motives. The comparison involves numerous for the most parts, and normallys. (shrink)

The manifold phenomena of love exhibited in diverse human societies during different periods of recorded history are rooted in biological features of human beings. The human procreative urge among women is natural to our species. Maternal love is rooted in mammalian nature. The ideal love of a mother for her child is a common transcultural paradigm of selflessness. This chapter first examines the biological roots of love and subsequently to the social constraints within which its various forms are possible. It (...) then discusses the multiple kinds of possible objects of love and the threads connecting them, and explains the framework of moral, social, and legal norms within which human love is realized. Love is a paradigm of a developing emotion. Being in love is the natural sequel to falling in love. It involves wanting to be with the person loved, a strong desire to please, to share experience, and to delight in shared experiences. (shrink)

Each person should have their pride – a proper sense of their worth and dignity. Improper pride is arrogance; proper pride, one might say, is necessary for self‐respect. As an emotion, pride may take the form of a momentary emotional occurrence, as when, for example, one is complimented by people whose approval one appreciates on some achievement of one's own, of one's spouse, or of one's children. Pride may also take the form of a persistent, enduring, emotion, as when one (...) feels proud of one's beauty and figure, or of the good looks of one's spouse or children; of one's achievements; of some admirable possession one owns; of one's dog or horse; and of one's high rank and office. Christian theologians have taken certain forms of pride to be contraries, the former a deadly vice and the latter a virtue. Hume too took pride and humility to be contraries. (shrink)

The emotions distinctive of human beings, as opposed to other animals, are emotions that presuppose possession of a language and hence powers of intellect and rational will. The objects distinctive of human emotions presuppose mastery of a language and possession of rational abilities. Music itself has been considered to be the purest artistic expression of human emotions and of the striving of the human will. The emotions, in particular temporary emotions, have characteristic multiple associations, manifestations, and forms of expression. This (...) chapter distinguishes between the neural/physiological and somatic associations, on the one hand, and the behavioural manifestations and verbal expressions of the emotions, on the other. Behavioural manifestations and expressions of emotion and emotionally motivated actions lie along a volitional spectrum that ranges from the non‐voluntary to the involuntary, and from the voluntary but not intentional to the intentional and deliberate. (shrink)

Manifestations and expressions of emotion are elements of an ensemble of immediate reactive and responsive behaviour, emotion‐eliciting situation, past relationships and events, persistent emotions exhibited in intentional and emotionally motivated speech and action. These elements form, and reform, highly complex patterns – but, like the patterns of tribal carpets, the patterns display varying degrees of irregularity and asymmetry, which vary from rug to rug. The constitutional indeterminacy of the emotions, of their depth and authenticity, and of the motives to which (...) they give rise is part of the human condition. Susceptibility to emotions is a feature of advanced forms of animal life. For one's emotions should be felt for the right reasons, directed at the right objects, made manifest and expressed on the right occasions, and felt to the right degree. Then one's emotions are reasonable and justifiable, even though people cannot feel an emotion at will. (shrink)

Human emotions are passions – ways in which the soul is affected. It is noteworthy that the Cartesian conception, especially in its concern with the physiology of the emotions and with their causal order, inspires neuroscientific investigation of the emotions to this day. A detailed empiricist account of the character of the concepts of the emotions and of their mode of acquisition is to be found in the writings of John Locke. In his view, all ideas are derived either from (...) sensation or from reflection. The most influential psychological account of the emotions advanced in the late nineteenth century was the James‐Lange theory. It dominated reflection upon the emotions among experimental psychologists until the rise of behaviourism, and it again had a substantial influence towards the end of the twentieth century upon the somatic marker theory of the emotions advanced by the cognitive neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. (shrink)

Passions subsumes the natural human appetites (hunger, thirst, lust, and addictions); felt desires, such as urges, cravings, and impulses; some obsessions (obsessive emotions and compulsive obsessions); and the affections (agitations, moods, and emotions) of a living being. It is important to clarify the concept of emotion that is to locate it among the concepts of the passions thus construed, and to describe the differences between emotions and other passions. This chapter describes the conceptual boundaries that distinguish the emotions from other (...) affections, such as agitations and moods; from felt desires, such as urges and cravings; from obsessions and appetites; and also from attitudes. Emotions are classified as negative or positive, according as to whether one would (normally) prefer to feel such emotions (delighted, excited, overjoyed, contented, amused, affection), or prefer not to be subjected to them (feeling bored, envious, jealous, frightened, sorrow, embarrassed, humiliated). (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Baker's New Conception Waismann and Wittgenstein Wittgenstein on the Psychoanalytic Analogy Wittgenstein's Methodology Reconsidered Wittgenstein and Ryle 1: Categorial Confusions Wittgenstein and Ryle 2: Logical Geography Baker's Wittgenstein.

Throughout much of human history most people conceived of death as a transitional event. An alternative, secular, conception of death is as the permanent cessation of all life‐sustaining biological functions. The death of the physical organism is the death of the person or human being. However death be conceived, human beings are the only creatures that are aware of their mortality. The death penalty is often thought to be the most severe punishment of all, far worse than life imprisonment. Attitudes (...) towards death vary according to the acceptance or rejection of belief in an afterlife. Death in old age is generally held to be less deplorable than death in one's prime. Premature death, however, is commonly deemed to be tragic, but not because merely being alive is a good of one kind or another, let alone good in itself. Lucretius exaggerated the symmetry between prenatal and post‐ mortem events. (shrink)

Entertainments and celebrations are meant to give audiences and participants pleasure. Pleasure and enjoyment are an integral part of flourishing human life, and the desire for pleasure and enjoyment is a distinctive aspect of human nature. Psychological hedonism is a descriptive doctrine concerned with giving an account of actual human motivation. Ethical hedonism is a prescriptive doctrine that advances the view that human beings ought to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, that prospective pleasure and pain are severally the only good (...) reasons for action. ‘Pleasure’, ‘enjoyment’, and ‘being pleased’ are three graces that stand at the intersection of psychology, axiology, and practical reasoning. The relation between pleasure and awareness or consciousness of pleasure is subtle and unlike the corresponding relation to having a pain. To live the life of a practical hedonist is to live a life guided by the pursuit of pleasure. (shrink)

The powers of intellect and will, possession of which is constitutive of having a mind, are not powers of the mind, but of the being that has a mind. The Platonic metaphysical conception of the soul is of great interest irrespective of its informing both ancient and Renaissance neo‐Platonist ideas about the soul and its immortality, and, via Augustine, ultimately moulding the misconceived Cartesian conception of the soul. The dividing line between the soul and the flesh is quite different from (...) that between the mind and the body. The soul is associated with aesthetic sensibility and with the appreciation of beauty and pathos, with which conscience has no connection. The evil‐doer commonly aims, explicitly or implicitly, to destroy the moral order of humanity and the moral restraints on behaviour that are constitutive of moral beings. Evil‐doers have to suppress the voice of conscience. (shrink)

Some of human evil is a function of the historical stage of society. The evils and wickednesses of bureaucracy are as old as well‐developed bureaucratic hierarchies. Evil‐doers have character traits that may form recognizable patterns with explanatory weight. Evil‐doers produce reasons for their evil‐doing and offer justifications for their evil deeds. Psychological experiments may indeed establish important correlations and statistical probabilities that may be crucial for the formation of intelligent social policy. The greatest students of the place of evil in (...) human life and of the subjective psychology of evil in a complex social setting are great novelists, dramatists, and poets. From the late eighteenth century onwards ideological beliefs played a major role in stimulating evil, not for the greater glory of God but for the future glory of man. The first major social movement that bent an ideology to wholly evil policies were the Jacobins during the French Revolution. (shrink)

Global fatalism is an attitude towards life, an attitude of resignation and acceptance of what happens. Global fatalism in the form of predestinarianism is typically, but not exclusively, associated with monotheism rather than with polytheism, and in particular with Christianity and Islam. An individual form of fatalism consists in the belief that specific incidents in a person's life are preordained. Local fatalism appears to be common to many different cultures and societies. Individual fatalism is associated with other important events in (...) human life, such as meeting the person with whom one is destined to fall in love. The ubiquity of the various forms of individual fatalism suggests that they have a deep appeal to human sentiment. Descartes's successors, lumbered with dualism but rejecting causal interaction, struggled to preserve human freedom while acknowledging nomological determinism. Global nomological determinism is a picture, a preconception of the nature of change in all its forms. (shrink)

Happiness has been at the centre of philosophical reflection ever since Plato and Aristotle. Epicureans thought of happiness as the satisfaction of one's minimal needs and the absence of further desires. True happiness may be the love of another, or successful and virtuous public service recognized by society, or successful engagement in a favoured activity. Youthful happiness involves intensity of feeling, engagement with the passing moment, the discovery of first love and of sexuality, and the joys of dedication to a (...) beloved. The different forms of human engagement involve different kinds of happiness. Physical normality and good health are patently preconditions of happiness inasmuch as physical abnormalities and persistent diseases are barriers to leading a healthy and normal human life. A person's social conditions are highly relevant to the possibility of happiness. Happiness can be marred or shattered by a multitude of accidents of fate and by human malice, political upheavals, and economic disasters. (shrink)